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Pluralism without Genic Causes?*
Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Matthew Dunn, Jennifer Cianciollo,
and Costas Mannouris†‡
Since the fundamental challenge that I laid at the doorstep of the pluralists was to
defend, with nonderivative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters
has failed to meet that challenge. Waters agrees with me that there is only a single
cause operating in these models, but he argues for a notion of causal ‘parsing’ to
sustain the viability of some form of pluralism. Waters and his colleagues have some
very interesting and important ideas about the sciences, involving pluralism and parsing
or partitioning causes, but they are ideas in search of an example. He thinks he has
found an example in the case of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not.
1. Methodological and Epistemological Concerns.
1.1. Introductory Points. Since the fundamental challenge that I laid
at the doorstep of the pluralists was to defend, with reasons or nonderiv-
ative models, a strong notion of genic cause, it is fatal that Waters has
failed to meet that challenge. He gives no new arguments for the existence
of independent genic causes. Despite my arguments that there is no sense
to be made of the notion of independent genic causal models, Waters
continues to refer to genic causes. Waters appears to agree with me that
there is only a single cause operating in these models, but he argues for
a notion of causal ‘parsing’ to sustain the viability of some form of plu-
ralism. Nevertheless, the fundamental point is that he seems to have ex-
plicitly abandoned the notion of an independent genic cause. My analysis
in Section 6 of “Why the Gene Will Not Return” (Lloyd 2005) stands.
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PLURALISM WITHOUT GENIC CAUSES? 335
While that is really most of what there is to be said, and that is self-
evident from reading Waters’ paper, there are several other points raised
by Waters that deserve to be addressed.
First, a minor point. Waters seems to imply that I made up the term,
‘genic pluralism’. Not so. S&K1 (1988) use it to describe their own po-
sition, which I assumed that Waters was also defending in KSW (1990).
I understand that he wants to distance himself from such a position, and
I welcome his retraction of claims made in that paper that seem to indicate
a preference for the genic view. Waters admits that pragmatic consider-
ations disfavor the use of genic models, and favor the multilevel models—
under the assumption that these models are empirically adequate.
Secondly, Waters seems to think that he and his coauthors hold a
monopoly on the term ‘pluralism’. But, I discussed three different types
of pluralism in my target paper—a circumstance that he completely ig-
nores. Waters continues to speak as if his type of pluralism is the only
type, rather than acknowledging the type of pluralist I actually am. His
view is unduly restrictive.
1.2. History, Method, and Merit. One standard objection to my posi-
tion is winningly put by Waters: “It is not as if the diploid model owns
the information above the alleles and the genic model owns the infor-
mation below the diploid genotype” (Waters 2005, 321; emphasis added).
The key point here is the priority of actual discovery. When a factor—
for example, a level of interactor—has been discovered to have an influ-
ence on the outcome of a selective process via the application of a hier-
archical model or method, it seems only reasonable to say that the
hierarchical approach should be credited with that discovery. If the model
is later translated into a genic model, and the genic advocates then com-
plain that the hierarchists don’t own the higher-level information, well
. . . in a sense that’s true . . . but here they seem to be insensitive to the
empirical side of the biology.
It is a historical fact that the investigators of the sickle-cell gene used
a diploid model (Taliaferro and Huck 1923; Neel 1947). It is a historical
fact that the discovers of the full selection regime of the t-allele used a
gametic model, a diploid model, and a demic model (Lewontin and Dunn
1990; Lewontin 1962). Therefore, it is a historical fact that the genic
versions of these models are derivative.
But, philosophers will tell us that it is irrelevant which model was
involved in producing the actual higher-level information. In other words,
what is important, according to Waters, is that it is possible to describe
1. In conformity with the abbreviations adopted in “Why the Gene Will Not Return,”
‘S&K’ is Sterelny and Kitcher, and ‘KSW’ is Kitcher, Sterelny, and Waters.
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causality differently in the two different sorts of model—genic and hi-
erarchical—and that both of these sorts of models draw upon multiple
levels of information. The latter claim is true; the former, I do not grant.
But again, and it is a scientific and empirical question, Where and how
do we obtain the multiple levels of information that are used in these
models?
It might appear to be Waters’ hidden assumption in this argument that
philosophy of science is not concerned with the empirical value of actual
scientific theories, but only with their metaphysical implications. In other
words, he seems unconcerned about which approach has yielded the cru-
cial information required to advance the field. On my view, however, if
philosophy of science is weighing the value of the genic and hierarchical
approaches, then surely their empirical merits (particularly their episte-
mological and methodological strengths) must be included in such a
judgment.
So, suppose we were unaware of higher-level information and its impact
on evolutionary outcomes. Using the genic approach, how would we
obtain such information? Famously, George Williams advocated a rule
of thumb for answering this question: Do not look for higher-level in-
formation at all unless the genic level has been proven to be empirically
inadequate. Equally famously, the vast majority of practicing geneticists
and behavioral biologists took this recommendation as a dogmatic law
(see Lloyd [1988] 1994, 95, 121–122). Thus, it was the hierarchical selec-
tionists—and only the hierarchical selectionists—who successfully for-
mulated the methods for seeking out and documenting the higher-level
interactions that were involved in evolutionary dynamics involving kin
groups, demes, etc. (Lloyd 2005). In contrast, Waters proposes that
“[g]enic selection theoreticians learn that a genic environment needs to be
partitioned in a model, if there are different selective pressures on the
allele type in different spaces of the genic environment” (Waters 2005,
322). In other words, he needs to partition the environment, just in case
partitioning the environment makes a difference to gene fitness. And how
will a genic theorist know this?
Waters proposes that the genic selectionists are not just capable of
accommodating, or representing truthfully, but also seeking out such
higher-level interactions. Has he given any reasons for thinking that this
is so? Is there any evidence to support this claim? Is there an example of
genic selectionists successfully establishing a higher-level causal force
where hierarchical selectionists missed it? No, no, and no.
In sum, ‘ownership’ of the higher-level information does not rest on
simple historical priority. Rather, methodologically, the hierarchical views
have developed approaches and methods for seeking out higher-level in-
formation (and they have been very effective at finding it), while the genic
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approaches have no such methods, making them epistemically and meth-
odologically inferior. Moreover, they have a history of methodological
dogmatism opposing the very existence of such methods. Furthermore,
Waters has given us no reason to believe that genic models hold any
promise of grounding practices designed to obtain such information, with-
out simply borrowing the methods already formulated for hierarchical
models. Finally, all of this is highly relevant, because philosophical eval-
uation of the merits of the genic and hierarchical approaches demands
consideration of their methodological and epistemological value, not only
of their causal or metaphysical standing.
Certainly, Waters does not wish to return us to pre-Kuhnian days
wherein we sanitize our pure metaphysical questions about units of se-
lection from details of the actual practice and history of the science.
Nothing in his body of work would lead me to think so. Given that I
have argued in my target paper that the genic model construction and
metaphysical conclusions are bound together in the arguments as pre-
sented, my opponents are not free to slice off metaphysical questions as
they wish.
Still, we can expect that Waters and sympathizers will respond that the
genic view is on a causal par with the hierarchical view, and that the
documented methodological and epistemic priority or superiority of the
hierarchical view cuts no ice metaphysically. I must remind the reader,
then, that this argument has already been thoroughly addressed in Section
6 of “Why the Gene will Not Return.” I claim that the separation of
metaphysical from epistemological and methodological issues is not sus-
tainable, unless the argument there is rebutted.
1.3. Derivation. Finally, let me note one final, odd claim. Waters writes:
Of course, the genic model is going to include information about
causal interactions in the environment. The fact that it depends on
such information doesn’t make it derivative of the diploid-genotypic
model. (2005, 321)
Can Waters mean to claim that the genic model is not derivative? He
can’t mean this. It is straightforwardly mathematically and logically de-
rivative. It is also straightforwardly historically derivative. So, we could
say, it is both ‘timelessly’ and historically derivative. Is there some other
form of ‘derivative’ that Waters has in mind?
The issue of derivation is crucial. A derived model can contain nothing
that the model from which it was derived did not also contain. The impact
of this is that there cannot be any new causal or metaphysical information
in the derived model. But since the issue of the causal independence of
338 ELISABETH A. LLOYD ET AL.
these models has provoked such confusion, let’s consider the arguments
for such independence in more detail.
2. Causes, Multiple Models, and Metaphysics.
2.1. Alternate Models. Waters asserts that I disagree with the statement
that there are cases where models do not disagree about facts (2005, 312).
Another way to put this point is that there are alternate models for the
same situation.
I do not disagree with this. I never have. If Waters and his supporters
read Chapter 4 of my book, The Structure and Confirmation of Evolu-
tionary Theory ([1988] 1994), they will find discussion and analysis of such
cases.
Another key point concerns the prevalence of what Waters calls PERM
situations. In practicing population genetics,2 this actually involves a con-
fined set of models, contrary to the impression the reader might get from
Waters’ paper. More importantly, there are a number of important em-
pirical and theoretical cases from hierarchical selection that are not PERM
cases, including the t-allele case featured in Waters’ original “Tempered
Realism” (1991). (Cf. Goodnight and Stevens 1997; Wade 1985.) Since
Waters denies that PERM cases involve different causes, but involve only
different causal ‘parsings’, it becomes imperative to understand precisely
what this latter term means. Remember, in order to sustain a substantial
form of metaphysical pluralism, the different models were originally
claimed to represent distinct causes, including genic causes. In Section 6
of the target paper, I argue that without a distinct and independent genic
causal level, there are no genuinely independent models being represented,
and therefore, no real alternatives among which to choose. Now, Waters
proposes replacing such ‘real’ causes with ‘parsed’ causes. He also wishes
to replace the metaphysical pluralism of S&K with an ‘epistemological’
pluralism. Our focus, then, will be on whether such parsed causes can
possibly supply interestingly independent explanations from among which
to choose. I turn now to the section written by my colleagues.
2.2. Parsing.3 Waters argues that we are compelled to accept pluralism
because two or more different models can be constructed that represent
the same selection process equally well. He notes that in some selection
processes the conceptual division between selected domains and environ-
ments can be drawn in at least two different ways, both being correct in
2. See Waters’ citations of Dugatkin and Reeve 1994; Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2002.
3. This section is written by Matthew Dunn, Jennifer Cianciolo, and Costas
Mannouris.
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that they result in empirically adequate models. By drawing different
conceptual divisions between selected domains and environments, Waters
claims that the models are ‘parsing the causes’ involved in the selection
process differently, i.e., each parsing captures the same underlying causal
interactions. He argues that the existence of two empirically adequate
models of the same selection process that parse the causes differently is
good reason to adopt a form of pluralism about levels of selection—to
admit that there is not always a “single, correct way to represent the
causal structure of the world” (2005, 312).
Waters operationalizes the notion of ‘parsing causes’ by redrawing the
conceptual division between selected domain and environment. One such
redrawing might involve simply ‘changing the labels’. For example, ‘causal
interplay in the environment’ in one model becomes ‘interactors involved
in a selection process’ in the other. But, this does not support an interesting
pluralism; it is simply substituting synonyms.
At the other end of the spectrum, a strong pluralism would result if
two empirically adequate models of the same selection process represented
different causal interactions. For example, in the sickle-cell case, if
when both models adequately account for the frequency ofAW (WS SA
the sickle allele, this would be an interesting pluralism, because the two
models would be representing different underlying causal processes. But,
this is not the case. And importantly, as we have seen, Waters does not
require that there be a pluralism of underlying causal structures. More-
over, in the sickle-cell case, Waters explicitly endorses the view that the
genic and diploid-genotype models identify the same underlying causal
structure.
Waters’ account of ‘parsing causes’ must therefore fall somewhere be-
tween the weak pluralism of relabeling and the strong pluralism of dif-
ferent causal interactions. The most charitable rendering of this notion
would seem to be something like the following. In genic accounts, the
boundary between the environmental domain and the selected domain is
drawn between two alleles at a single locus. In the sickle-cell case, the
diploid-genotype model does not draw any causally relevant, conceptual
distinction between these two alleles; therefore, the difference between the
two models is not simply one of relabeling. Yet, the two models contain
exactly the same information about causal interactions—this information
is simply partitioned differently. It is in this sense, then, that Waters is a
pluralist. There are different ways to partition the same information in
models that account for the same underlying causes equally well. We
choose among parsings based on pragmatic considerations, which may
have important consequences, as spelled out by Waters’ discussion (2005)
of Reichenbach on volitional decisions.
The key point, though, remains that the genic and genotypic models
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represent the same causal structure. Waters owes us an account of how,
given that Lloyd has argued that both of these model types are derivative
from one another, they could represent substantively different causal pars-
ings. As things stand, they do not seem able to capture any interesting
or robust form of pluralism.
2.3. Genic Causes. The other new addition in Waters’ paper is the ap-
plication of Woodward’s theory of the manipulability notion of causes to
the genic case. This appeal, like that to parsing, will not recover a robust
notion of genic cause for Waters. This is because Waters has misrepre-
sented my position, here. He claims that I am a monist, and that I think
the diploid causal model gives the only true cause, while the genic causal
model does not. This is false. The truth is that I don’t think there is any
interesting, independent genic causal model at all. And Waters—even
using Woodward’s very valuable and sensible theory of causality—has
failed to address the challenges laid down in Section 6 and Section 8 of
the target paper, regarding agency and tractability in a genic theory.
Fundamentally, Waters is trying to use parsing to get a notion of genic
causality off the ground, by casting genes as interactors. But, I argued at
length in my paper—an argument that Waters has not rebutted—that
genic selectionists fail in that effort. In sum, when we attempt to oper-
ationalize Waters’ notion of parsing, we end up with a weak view that
cannot support the kind of distinctions necessary to make a real difference
in the theoretical choices available to us.
In general, allelic models can be (and often are) used as simplifying
tools, guides to research, hints about good modeling techniques, and
calculating devices (Michod 1982; Dugatkin and Reeve 1994; Kerr and
Godfrey-Smith 2002). But, allelic models have never been shown to sustain
a notion of genic cause that is not derivative, and nothing in Waters’
present paper successfully shows otherwise.
2.4. Waters’ Pluralism. This raises the issue of what Waters is really
doing with his whole project. He is, as he says, interested in a fundamental
epistemological issue, involving cases in which there are multiple models
of causation—each of which is true, but none of which is uniquely true.
I would like the reader to entertain a possibility: Waters and his colleagues
have some very interesting and important ideas about the sciences, in-
volving pluralism and parsing or partitioning causes, but they are ideas
in search of an example. He thinks he has found an example in the case
of hierarchical and genic selection. I think he has not.
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Erratum
“Pluralism without Genic Causes?” (in vol. 72, no. 2, April 2005) contains
a misspelling of a coauthor’s surname. The correct spelling is ‘Cianciolo’.
